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A FOOTNOTE TO "PENUMBRA" IN 
GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT 
Henry T. Greely* 
The foregoing cases suggest that specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have 
penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life 
and substance. I 
* * * * * • 
Penumbra . I. The partially shaded region around the shadow of an opaque 
body. where only a part of the light from the luminous body is cut off; the partial 
shadow, as distinguished from the total shadow or umbra; esp. that surrounding the 
total shadow of the moon. or of the earth. in an eclipse . 
4. . .. A partial shade or shadow (in various metaphorical applications), esp. re-
garded as bordering upon a fuller or darker one2 
Since Justice Douglas's opinion for the Court in Griswold v. 
Connecticut, the source of the federal constitution's right to privacy 
has been fixed in the penumbras of the Bill of Rights. A penumbra 
seems a strange place to find rights to use contraception, to own 
obscene literature, or to have an abortion. Penumbra is an obscure 
word, known to few (and fewer still before Griswold). If the reader 
knows its meaning, it calls to mind shadows and darkness, unfortu-
nate connotations for affirmative rights. The source of the Griswold 
opinion's privacy right has been controversial and critical commen-
tary has focused on the absence of a concrete constitutional anchor 
for this asserted right.J 
Why did Justice Douglas use penumbra to describe the source 
for the privacy right? Penumbra did not appear in any of the briefs 
in Griswold or in the lower court decision. It was not used in the 
academic commentary on privacy referred to in the opinion or the 
briefs. It had not been featured in earlier opinions concerning pri-
vacy or the scope of the Bill of Rights. This essay explores that 
question through an examination of the history of the judicial use of 
* Associate Professor of Law. Stanford University. 
I. Griswold v. Connecticut. 381 U.S. 479. 484 (1965). 
2. 7 THE OXFORD E~GLISH DICTIO'-OARY 660 ( 1933). 
3. The criticism started as early as one of the dissenting opinions in Griswold, where, 
after reviewing the first. third. fourth. fifth, ninth, and fourteenth amendments, Justice Stew-
art asks "What provision of the Comtitution. then. does make this state law invalidry" 381 
U.S. at 530. 
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penumbra before Griswold.4 
Astronomer Johannes Kepler coined the word penumbra in 
1604 from the Latin words paene, meaning almost, and umbra, for 
shadow. Kepler was describing eclipses and invented penumbra to 
be able to distinguish between the sharp, deep shadow, or umbra, of 
the earth on the moon during a full lunar eclipse and the less dis-
tinct shading that surrounds the umbra and produces a partial lunar 
eclipse. 
This technical meaning is still the primary meaning of the 
word, but in the last three hundred eighty-five years, penumbra has 
acquired other meanings, including two other technical definitions: 
in astronomy, the lighter portion at the periphery of a sunspot, and 
in art, the part of a painting where shadow fades into light. It has 
also acquired the figurative sense relevant to this inquiry. The Ox-
ford English Dictionary traces this metaphorical use of penumbra 
back at least as far as 1801, when a female English novelist (not, 
unhappily, Jane Austen) wrote "I will defend him, madam, ... 
against every shadow, every penumbra of aristocratic insolence. "s 
Computerized databases of reported decisions make it possible 
to trace the history of judicial word usage, at least to the limits in 
time and accuracy of the databases. Those databases include all 
reported federal cases and most twentieth century reported state 
cases.6 The databases show that penumbra was not in common ju-
dicial use before Griswold. In federal courts, from its first use in 
1871 until the Griswold decision in June 1965, penumbra appeared 
in thirty-six district court opinions, thirty-eight circuit court opin-
ions, and twenty-three opinions from the United States Supreme 
Court. Forty-six of those ninety-seven uses were in quotations from 
other sources. Of the fifty-one original uses, twenty-six were made 
by just four judges: Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Learned Hand, 
Benjamin Cardozo, and William 0. Douglas. Examining some of 
the opinions that have used penumbra may provide some insight 
into Justice Douglas's use of the word in Griswold. 
4. After writing this article, I learned of an earlier article covering the same topic: 
Henly, "Penumbra": The Roots of a Legal Metaphor, 15 HASTINGS CoN. L.Q. 81 (1987). 
That article covers some of the history discussed in this article and also concludes that pe-
numbra was poorly used in Griswold. Our conclusions about the history and our criticisms of 
penumbra are different. 
5. Maria Edgeworth, Angelina iv (1801), quoted in 7 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DIC-
TIONARY at 660 (1933). 
6. I used both Lexis and Westlaw in searching for uses of penumbra. Both services 
purported to contain the texts of federal cases from 1789. Neither service followed a consis-
tent pattern with state cases. State cases generally were in the databases for earlier periods 
from the state's highest court than from other courts, but, for most states, neither service 
contained any cases decided before 1899. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, the 
most relevant state court for this inquiry, was available in Westlaw only from 1899. 
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In light of its later role in Roe v. Wade, 7 it is ironic that the first 
use of penumbra in a federal case dealt with the legal status of 
someone between life and death. In Montgomery v. Bevans, 8 Justice 
Field, sitting on circuit, had to decide who owned certain property 
in San Francisco. The grantee had disappeared several days before 
delivery of the deed, never to be seen again. After seven years, his 
father claimed the property as his heir, but the claim could only be 
good if the son had been alive at the time the deed was delivered. 
Field used penumbra in summarizing one of the other side's argu-
ments: "[C)ounsel argue that there is no presumption in favor of 
the continuance of life during the penumbra, or death period, of 
seven years . . . . "9 
After Montgomery, the word penumbra does not appear again 
in reported cases until the turn of the century and the opinions of 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.lo Holmes liked the word, using it in 
four Supreme Court opinions and at least three opinions of the Mas-
sachusetts Supreme Judicial Court between 1899 and 1902. He usu-
ally used it in discussing one problem, the need to draw partly 
arbitrary lines. 
This issue had occupied Holmes long before he became a judge. 
In 1873 the thirty-two year old Holmes featured it in a theory of the 
evolution of law. 
The growth of law is very apt to take place in this way: Two widely different 
cases suggest a general distinction, which is a clear one when stated broadly. But as 
new cases cluster around the opposite poles, and begin to approach each other, the 
distinction becomes more difficult to trace; the determinations are made one way or 
the other on a very slight preponderance of feeling, rather than articulate reason; 
and at last a mathematical line is arrived at by the contact of contrary decisions, 
which is so far arbitrary that it might equally well have been drawn a little further 
to the one side or to the other. The distinction between the groups, however, is 
philosophical, and it is better to have a line drawn somewhere in the penumbra 
between darkness and light, than to remain in uncertainty-' I 
Between 1899 and 1902, Holmes used penumbra in three deci-
7. 410 U.S. 113, !52 (1973). 
8. 17 F. Cas. 628 (9th C.C.D.Cal. 1871) (No. 9,735). 
9. !d. at 632. 
10. "Penumbra" did appear in one other federal opinion in the nineteenth century, but 
only in a suit involving the expenses of the wonderfully named United States Marshal for the 
District of Oregon, Penumbra Kelly. United States v. Kelly, 89 F. 946 (9th C.C.A. 1898). 
See also Kelly v. Matlock. 85 Cal. 122, 24 P. 642 (1890) (mortgage dispute involving the same 
person). 
II. Holmes, The Theory of Torts. 7 AM. L. REV. 652, 654 (July 1873), reprinted in F. 
KELLOGG, THE FORMATIVE ESSAYS OF JUSTICE HOLMES, 117, 119 (1984). This quotation 
was the source of a grudge Holmes long held against Judge Charles Doe, Chief Justice of 
New Hampshire. Holmes had sent Doe proofs of the article and was surprised to find a later 
Doe opinion using the idea behind this quotation without attribution. Thirty-seven years 
later, Holmes complained of this injustice in a letter to Wigmore. See Reid, Brandy in His 
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sions of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, most signifi-
cantly in Danforth v. Groton Water Co.12 In Danforth, the 
plaintiff's eminent domain case against a water company had be-
come entangled in shifting procedural statutes that first barred, then 
allowed, the plaintiff's recovery. Holmes referred to penumbra m 
discussing the nature of constitutional rules. 
Perhaps the reasoning of the cases has not always been as sound as the instinct 
which directed the decisions. It may be that sometimes it would have been as well 
not to attempt to make out that the judgment of the court was consistent with 
constitutional rules, if such rules were to be taken to have the exactness of mathe-
matics. It may be that it would have been better to say definitely that constitutional 
rules. like those of the common law, end in a penumbra where the Legislature has a 
certain freedom in fixing the line, as has been recognized with regard to the police 
power.l3 
After his 1902 appointment to the United States Supreme 
Court, Holmes used penumbra four times during his thirty years on 
the Court: Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, t4 Schlesinger v. 
Wisconsin, Is Springer v. Government of the Philippine Islands, to and 
Water: Correspondence Between Doe, Holmes. and Wigmore, 57 Nw. U.L. REV. 522, 529 
(1962). 
Holmes returned to the idea of partly arbitrary lines many times in writing. In the first 
chapter on torts in THE COMMON LAW, he used the term in describing the jury's authority. 
Legal, like natural divisions, however clear in their general outline, will be found on 
exact scrutiny to end in a penumbra or debatable land. This is the region of the 
jury, and only cases falling on this doubtful border are likely to be carried far in 
court. 
0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 127 (1881). 
Eighteen years later, he revisited the term in a similar context in the Harvard Law 
Review: 
In our approach towards exactness we constantly tend to work out definite 
lines or equators to mark distinctions which we first notice as a difference of poles. 
It is evident in the beginning that there must be differences in the legal position of 
infants and adults. In the end we establish twenty-one as the dividing point. There 
is a difference manifest at the outset between night and day. The statutes of Massa-
chusetts fix the dividing points at one hour after sunset and one hour before sunrise, 
ascertained according to mean time. When he has discovered that a difference is a 
difference of degree, that distinguished extremes have between them a penumbra in 
which one gradually shades into the other, a tyro thinks to puzzle you by asking 
where you are going to draw the line. and an advocate of more experience will show 
the arbitrariness of the line proposed by putting cases very near to it on one side or 
the other. But the theory of the law is that such lines exist, because the theory of 
the law as to any possible conduct is that it is either lawful or unlawful. As that 
difference has no gradation about it, when applied to shades of conduct that are 
very near each other it has an arbitrary look. 
Holmes, Law in Science and Science in Law, 12 HARV. L. REV. 443, 456-57 (1899). 
12. 178 Mass. 472. 477, 59 N.E. 1033, 1034 (1901). See also Kerslake v. Cummings, 
180 Mass. 65, 68, 61 N.E. 760, 761 (1901); Driscoll v. Towle, 181 Mass. 416,419, 63 N.E. 
922, 923 (1902). 
13. 178 Mass. at 476-77, 59 N.E. at 1034. 
14. 240 U.S. 403, 426 (1916) (Holmes, J., concurring). 
15. 270 U.S. 230, 241 (1926) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
16. 277 U.S. 189, 209 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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Olmstead v. United States.11 Three of those uses occurred in discus-
sions of line-drawing. 
Holmes first used penumbra in the Supreme Court in Hanover 
Star Milling Co., a trademark case. At issue was the geographical 
reach of one firm's common law mark, "Tea Rose" flour. Holmes 
concurred, but suggested that state borders would provide a useful 
limit to the trademark. "If this view be adopted we get rid of all 
questions of penumbra, of shadowy marches where it is difficult to 
decide whether the business extends to them. We have sharp lines 
drawn upon the fundamental consideration of the jurisdiction 
originating the right." 1s 
In Schlesinger, the Court invalidated a Wisconsin estate tax 
that conclusively presumed any gift within six years of death to be 
"in contemplation of" death and therefore taxed it. Holmes argued 
in dissent that the presumption should be upheld as a reasonable 
although necessarily arbitrary line. 
I think that our discussion should end if we admit, what I certainly believe, that 
reasonable men might regard six years as not too remote. Of course many gifts will 
be hit by the tax that were made with no contemplation of death. But the law 
allows a penumbra to be embraced that goes beyond the outline of its object in order 
that the object may be secured. A typical instance is the prohibition of the sale of 
unintoxicating malt liquors in order to make effective a prohibition of the sale of 
beer.l 9 
In Springer, Holmes dissented from a decision invalidating cer-
tain Philippine government corporations as violating the separation 
of powers. The Holmes dissent began: "The great ordinances of 
the Constitution do not establish and divide fields of black and 
white. Even the more specific of them are found to terminate in a 
penumbra shading gradually from one extreme to the other. "2o 
Holmes's last judicial use of penumbra broke from his usual 
pattern. In Olmstead, the Court held that a federal court could use 
evidence obtained through wiretapping. Brandeis wrote the major 
dissent, which Holmes joined, but Holmes wrote his own very short 
dissenting opinion. Holmes maintained that federal courts should 
not admit wiretap evidence whether or not its use would violate the 
Constitution, a question on which he reserved judgment: 
17. 277 U.S. 438, 469 (1928) (Holmes. J., dissenting). 
18. 240 U.S. at 426. 
19. 270 U.S. at 241. Although in dissent. Holmes's statement in Schlesinger. and par-
ticularly his use of prohibition as an illustration, was enough to prompt an angry law review 
article, advertised as "one of a series of articles to be published in book form under the 
general caption 'Judicial Mileposts on the Road to Absolutism.·" Black, The "Penumbra 
Doctrine" in Prohibition Enforcement, 27 ILL. L. REv. 511, 511 (1933). 
20. 277 U.S. at 209. 
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While I do not deny it, I am not prepared to say that the penumbra of the Fourth 
and Fifth Amendments covers the defendant, although I fully agree that Courts are 
apt to err by sticking too closely to the words of a law where those words import a 
policy that goes beyond them.21 
Penumbra appeared in only two other Supreme Court opinions 
during Holmes's tenure: in a Brandeis dissent quoting Holmes's 
dissent in Schlesinger22 and in a majority opinion quoting a district 
court's conclusion that the region within twenty-five miles of a 
town's limits is a penumbra.23 But while it was being used infre-
quently in the Supreme Court, Judge Learned Hand was expanding 
the word's use in the lower federal courts. 
Hand used penumbra in eleven opinions from 1915 to 1950.24 
Although the contexts in which he used penumbra varied, he gener-
ally used it to denote the indistinct borders of words or concepts. 
Holmes had usually used penumbra when he was trying to stress 
the need to draw an appropriate line even if the line itself would 
inevitably be arbitrary-a line between juvenile and adult, between 
day and night, between constitutional and unconstitutional asser-
21. 277U.S.at469. 
22. Untermyer v. Anderson, 276 U.S. 440, 451 (1928). 
23. Continental Baking Co. v. Woodring, 286 U.S. 352, 370 (1932). Continental Baking 
Co. involved Kansas legislation taxing and regulating trucking. The legislation exempted 
trucks of firms doing business in a city when operating within twenty-five miles of that city. 
The lower court used penumbra in a passage comparing the Kansas legislation to Oregon 
legislation upheld by the Oregon Supreme Court, which had provided a five mile exempt 
radius. Interestingly, immediately after using the word penumbra to describe the twenty-five 
mile exempt zone, the judge quoted a Holmes dissent on the need to draw arbitrary lines-
but not a dissent that used penumbra. 
Of course, 25 miles is further than 5 miles; and it does seem that a 25-mile 
exemption, even for facility of administration, is pretty far. But, if the state has the 
power to create this penumbra about the city, the question of the distance must be 
left to the Legislature, unless it is clearly arbitrary. The language of Justice Holmes, 
while in a dissenting opinion, is an apt statement of a familiar principle of law: 
"When a legal distinction is determined, as no one doubts that it may be, between 
night and day, chtldhood and maturity, or any other extremes, a point has to be 
fixed or a line has to be drawn, or gradually picked out by successive decisions, to 
mark where the change takes place." 
Continental Baking Co. v. Woodring, 55 F.2d 347, 355 (D. Kan. 1931) (quoting Louisville 
Gas & Electric Co. v. Coleman, 277 U.S. 32, 41 (1928)). 
24. Hand used "penumbra" in the following cases: 
Lambert Pharmacal Co. v. Bolton Chern. Corp., 219 F. 325, 327 (S.D.N.Y. 1915); The 
Poznan, 276 F. 418, 428 (S.D.N.Y. 1921 ); Van Vlaanderen v. Peyet Silk Dyeing Corp., 278 F. 
933,994 (S.D. N.Y. 1921); Wachs v. Balsam, 38 F.2d 50, 51 (2d Cir. 1930); Landers, Frary & 
Clark v. Universal Cooler Corp., 85 F.2d 46, 48 (2d Cir. 1936); Commissioner v. Ickelheimer. 
132 F.2d 660, 662 (2d Cir. 1943); Andrews v. Commissioner, 135 F.2d 314, 319 (2d Cir. 
1943); United States v. Heine, 151 F.2d 813, 817 (2d Cir. 1945); United States v. Rabinowitz, 
176 F.2d 732, 735 (2d Cir. 1949), rev'd 339 U.S. 56 (1950); International Bhd. of Elec. Work-
ers, Local 501 v. NLRB, 181 F.2d 34, 40 (2d Cir. 1950); and United States v. Dennis, 183 
F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950), aff'd, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). 
Lambert Pharmacal Co. and The Poznan were the first two uses of penumbra in lower 
federal courts since Montgomery v. Bevans, 17 F. Cas. 628 (C.C.D. Cal. 1871) (No. 9,735). 
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tions of power. Hand used it when he wanted to stress the difficulty 
of defining words or concepts-as used in statutes, contracts, trade-
marks, or ideas. 
Hand first used penumbra in Lambert Pharmacal Co. v. Bolton 
Chern. Corp.,2s a trademark case decided one year before Holmes's 
concurrence in Hanover Star Milling Co. The makers of Listerine 
sought an injunction against the manufacturer of a similar disinfec-
tant, named "Listogen." The defendant claimed that it was not ap-
ing Listerine, which had been distributed under that name for 
thirty-four years, but was referring back directly to Lord Lister, the 
promoter of antiseptic principles. It cited the words "Listerism," 
"Listerian," and "Listerize," which it claimed had been used in 
English before the distribution of Listerine. Hand rejected the de-
fendant's argument: "But the defendant does not use these words; 
at best 'Listogen' is a coined word with a penumbra of suggestion." 
In The Poznan,26 Hand was construing a clause in a shipping 
contract concerning " 'other circumstances ... which ... are likely 
to give rise to delay or difficulty in ... discharging' " and concluded 
that the clause "merely added a penumbra of meaning to each of 
the specified terms, so as to include similar things not literally cov-
ered by the terms themselves." In Van Vlaanderen v. Peyet Silk 
Dyeing Corp.,21 he considered whether a manager was a "mechanic, 
workingman or laborer" for purposes of a statute giving the wages 
of "employees" a preference in receiverships. 
And the word ''employee·· is defined in section 2 as ··mechanic, workingman or 
laborer. .. But these three words are plain enough, and there remains no penumbra 
of uncertainty, such as over-shadowed the use of "employee" in the act of 1885. 
[emphasis added] 
These early cases illustrate Hand's general use of penumbra 
throughout his career.28 In 1943, dissenting in Commissioner v. 
25. 219 F. 325, 327 (S.D.N.Y. 1915) 
26. 276 F. 418, 427-28 (S.D.N.Y. 1921). 
27. 278 F. 993, 994 (S.D.N.Y. 1921) 
28. See also Landers, Frary & Clark v. Universal Cooler Corp., 85 F.2d 46, 48 (2d Cir. 
1936). In this case, another trademark case, the plaintiff had used "Universal" for many 
years as the name of its electric household appliances. The defendant had recently named its 
electric refrigerators, an item never sold by the plaintiff, "Universal." Hand distinguished 
between the commercial use of coined and noncoined names: 'The proprietary connota-
tion,-'secondary meaning.' -of a word of common speech is harder to create and easier to 
lose, and its fringe or penumbra does not usually extend so far as that of a coined word ... 
Only twice did Hand use penumbra in reference to anything other than the definition of 
words or ideas. In Andrews v. Commissioner, 135 F.2d 314. 319 (2d Cir. 1943), Hand, in 
dissent, would have upheld the Tax Court. saying "[t)he case lies within that penumbra be-
tween light and darkness where the first tribunal should be final... Later in International 
Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 501 v. NLRB, 181 F.2d 34, 40 (2d Cir. 1950), he dealt with the 
first amendment implications of federal labor law's limitations on secondary picketing and 
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Ickelheimer,29 Hand argued, on a point of statutory construction, 
that 
the colloquial words of a statute have not the fixed and artificial content of scientific 
symbols; they have a penumbra, a dim fringe. a connotation, for they express an 
attitude of will, into which it is our duty to penetrate and which we must enforce 
ungrudgingly when we can ascertain it, regardless of imprecision in its expression. 
And in 1950, in United States v. Dennis, Hand made his last 
judicial use of penumbra in trying to define the phrase "clear and 
present danger," stating that "[i]t is a way to describe a penumbra 
of occasions, even the outskirts of which are indefinable, but within 
which, as is often the case, the courts must find their way as they 
can. "Jo 
While Hand was developing his usage of penumbra in the 
lower courts, the word saw only limited use at the Supreme Court. 
From Holmes's retirement to Justice Douglas's appointment, pe-
numbra was used in five opinions, three of them by Justice Benja-
min Cardozo.Jt Cardozo used penumbra in the same context as 
Holmes did, in discussing the problems of legislative line drawing. 
In Dayton Power & Light Co. v. Public Utilities Comm. ,32 he 
upheld the Commission's decision not to treat "good will" as an 
asset for rate base purposes, saying "[f]or the legislative process, at 
least equally with the judicial, there is an indeterminate penumbra 
within which choice is uncontrolled." Concurring in Schechter 
Poultry, Cardozo urged that the National Industrial Recovery Act 
was unconstitutional not only as too broad a delegation of legisla-
tive power, but as beyond the constitutional powers of Congress 
under the Commerce Clause. He recognized that "[ w ]hat is near 
and what is distant may at times be uncertain" but found "no pe-
numbra of uncertainty obscuring judgment here. To find immedi-
acy or directness here is to find it almost everywhere. "33 Finally, 
Cardozo, writing for the Court in Helvering v. Davis, upheld con-
gressional authority under the spending power to enact the old age 
benefits of the Social Security Act, but noted again the problems of 
drawing lines: 
the distinction between speech and action. "No doubt it is difficult to know when an equivo-
cal utterance has plainly emerged out of its penumbra into the full light of unalloyed incite-
ment.-. 
29. 132 F.2d 660, 662 (2d Cir. 1943 ). 
30. 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950), aff'd, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). 
31. The two opinions not discussed in text are Arrow-Hart & Hegeman Elec. Co. v. 
FfC, 291 U.S. 587. 607 (1934) (Stone, 1., dissenting). and Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 
465 (1939) (Frankfurter. J., concurring). 
32. Dayton Power & Light Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 292 U.S. 290, 309 (1934). 
33. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 554 (1935). 
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The conception of the spending power advocated by Hamilton and strongly rein-
forced by Story has prevailed over that of Madison, which has not been lacking in 
adherents. Yet difficulties are left when the power is conceded. The line must still 
be drawn between one welfare and another, between particular and general. Where 
this shall be placed cannot be known through a formula in advance of the event. 
There is a middle ground or certainly a penumbra in which discretion is at large. 
The discretion, however, is not confided to the courts. The discretion belongs to 
Congress, unless the choice is clearly wrong, a display of arbitrary power, not an 
exercise of judgment 34 
The addition of William 0. Douglas to the Supreme Court as-
sured penumbra's judicial future. Douglas was responsible for eight 
of the next eleven original uses of penumbra in the Supreme 
Court,Js but he used it slightly differently than his predecessors. 
His most-quoted use of penumbra before Griswold appeared in 
his opinion for the Court in Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln 
Mills.J6 Lincoln Mills first held that federal courts had jurisdiction 
to decide disputes about collective bargaining agreements, but then 
confronted the issue of what substantive law those courts should 
apply. 
We conclude that the substantive law to apply in suits under § 301(a) is federal 
law, which the courts must fashion from the policy of our national labor laws. The 
Labor Management Relations Act expressly furnishes some substantive law. It 
points out what the parties may or may not do in certain situations. Other 
problems will lie in the penumbra of express statutory mandates37 
This quotation is typical of Douglas's use of the word. In his 
first judicial use of penumbra, in dissent in United States v. Classic, 
he complained about criminalizing conduct "in the vague penumbra 
of a statute."Js In General Comm. of Adjustment v. Missouri-K-T 
R.R. Co. he located an issue of union jurisdiction under the Railway 
34. 301 u.s. 619, 640 (1937). 
35. Douglas used "penumbra" in the following cases before Griswold: United States v. 
Classic, 313 U.S. 299,331-32 (1941) (dissent); General Comm. of Adjustment v. Missouri-K-
T R.R., 320 U.S. 323, 336 (1943) (majority opinion); General Box Co. v. United States, 351 
U.S. 159, 169 (1956) (dissent); Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 457 
(1957) (majority opinion); Smith v. Sperling, 354 U.S. 91,97 (1957) (majority opinion); Pan-
ama Canal Co. v. Grace Line, 356 U.S. 309, 317 (1958) (majority opinion); Wilson v. Schnet-
tler, 365 U.S. 381, 392, n.S (1961) (dissent); and Federal Power Comm'n v. Texaco, Inc., 377 
U.S. 33, 39 (1964) (majority opinion). 
The other three original uses during this period are found in Screws v. United States, 325 
U.S. 91, 130 (1945) (Rutledge, J., concurring); Fernandez v. Wiener, 326 U.S. 340, 360 
(1945) (Stone, J., majority opinion); and Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72. 99 (1959) (Brennan, 
J., dissenting). Also, in Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 315 (1945), Justice 
Jackson's majority opinion returned to the Holmes/Cardozo use of penumbra quite directly, 
by quoting Holmes' opinion for the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Danforth v. 
Groton Water Co., 178 Mass. 472, 476-77. 59 N.E. 1033. 1033-34 (1901). 
36. 353 u.s. 448 (1957). 
37. !d. at 456-57 (citation omitted). 
38. 313 U.S. 299, 331 (1941). 
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Labor Act "far back in the penumbra of those few principles which 
[Congress] codified";39 in General Box Co. v. United States, he 
placed a problem "in the penumbra of Louisiana law";40 and in 
Panama Canal Co. v. Grace Line, he described a canal toll-setting 
issue as "a problem in the penumbra of the law."4t Dissenting in 
Wilson v. Schnettler, a search and seizure case, he attacked the argu-
ment that a declaratory judgment could be denied for discretionary 
grounds, urging that "[t]he judicial discretion to deny declaratory 
relief is in the penumbra of the constitutional requirement of 'case 
or controversy.' There is no such issue here. "42 
Justice Douglas did not restrict penumbras to laws. In Smith 
v. Sperling, a case involving the extent of diversity jurisdiction in 
stockholder derivative actions, he used the term to describe the ac-
tion the shareholders were challenging, saying that perhaps it "lies 
within the penumbra of business judgment, unaffected by fraud. "43 
In Federal Power Comm 'n v. Texaco, Inc. he used penumbra to de-
scribe the difficulties of fixing venue for a company like Texaco, 
contrasting it with the cases imagined by Congress, where a firm 
had a distinct location "with no penumbra of other places of busi-
ness, as here. "44 
Holmes, Cardozo, and Hand had used penumbra where they 
wanted to highlight the difficulties of drawing distinctions or mean-
ing. Their uses often contained references back to the primary 
meaning of their metaphor as a partial shadow. Douglas, on the 
other hand, used penumbra whenever he wanted to refer to a pe-
ripheral area or region, whether or not he wanted to point out the 
difficulty of line drawing or definition. And, unlike his predeces-
sors, Douglas never used the word in a way that harked back to its 
primary meaning. For Justice Douglas, penumbra had become a 
dead metaphor, a way to refer to an idea through an abbreviation 
that had been shorn of its own meaning. Douglas could have re-
placed penumbra with periphery or fringe with no loss of meaning 
or force. 
While Justice Douglas was using penumbra in the Supreme 
Court, it also saw limited use in the lower courts. Most of those 
uses were in quotations.4s Apart from the eleven uses by Judge 
39. 320 U.S. 323, 336 (1943). 
40. 351 U.S. 159, 169 (1956). 
41. 356 U.S. 309, 317 (1958). 
42. 365 U.S. 381, 392 n.5 (1961). 
43. 354 U.S. 91, 97 (1957). 
44. 377 U.S. 33, 39 (1964). 
45. The quotations were most often from the Douglas opinion in Lincoln Mills (thirteen 
uses), but also from Cardozo's opinion in Helvering v. Davis (five uses), Hand's opinion in 
Landers, Frary & Clark (four uses), and other judicial opinions (twelve uses). Two lower 
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Hand, there were only twenty-seven original uses of penumbra in 
the lower federal courts between Montgomery v. Bevans and Gris-
wold. Most of those uses referred either to a "penumbra of uncer-
tainty," the penumbra of a statute, or penumbra in Douglas's use, 
as an indistinct region surrounding something else. None was used 
in a case concerning privacy, contraception, or any other issue rele-
vant to Griswold v. Connecticut. 
It is interesting that penumbra was rarely used in federal 
courts, but was a favorite of such noted jurists as Holmes, Hand, 
Cardozo, and Douglas. 4 6 It is also fascinating to watch the differ-
ences in how they used the word, not so much in the meaning they 
gave it as in the contexts in which they used it. But the question 
remains: Why did Douglas use penumbra to describe the source of 
the right to privacy in Griswold? 
There is almost nothing in the history of the use of penumbra 
before Griswold to suggest such use. Of all its many uses, only one, 
in Justice Holmes's dissent in Olmstead, referred to the penumbra 
of any of the Bill of Rights. No published opinion used penumbra 
in connection with contraceptives, with marriage, or except argua-
bly for Holmes's dissent in Olmstead, with privacy. Before Gris-
wold, no published opinion held that rights of any sort lurked in a 
penumbra. 
Griswold itself provides little help. Penumbra is not used in the 
perfunctory lower court opinion,4 7 nor does it appear in the briefs 
for the parties or the four amicus briefs. Although, according to 
Bernard Schwartz, Douglas drastically revised his initial draft of 
the opinion as a result of suggestions from Justice Brennan, the ini-
tial draft as published by Schwartz uses penumbra in its concluding 
sentence: 
The prospects of police with warrants searching the sacred precincts of marital bed-
rooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives is repulsive to the idea of privacy 
and of association that make up a goodly part of the penumbra of the Constitution 
and Bill of Rights. Cf. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 16548 
As eventually published, the Douglas opinion uses penumbra 
court judges used penumbra in quotations from law review articles, one quoting Holmes and 
the other Landis. 
46. It was also a favored word of a federal judge from Oregon, James Alger Fee, who 
used it in at least three opinions: Jackson v. Flohr, 227 F.2d 607, 610 (9th Cir. 1955), cert. 
den., 350 U.S. 947 (1956); Kane v. SESAC, Inc., 54 F. Supp. 853, 859 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), and 
Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Northern Pac. Terminal Co .. 128 F. Supp. 475, 515 (D. Or. 
1953). 
47. State v. Griswold, 151 Conn. 544, 200 A.2d 479 (1964). 
48. B. SCHWARTZ, THE UNPVBLISHED OPINIONS OF THE WARREN COURT 236 
(1985). 
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twice and penumbral once. Early in the opinion, he asserts that 
"[i)n other words, the First Amendment has a penumbra where pri-
vacy is protected from governmental intrusion. "49 He follows that 
with the sentence quoted above invoking the penumbra of other 
parts of the Bill of Rights. Later he claims the Court has "had 
many controversies over these penumbral rights of 'privacy and re-
pose.' "so None of the uses provides a clue to its origin. Douglas 
does not cite a single case in which penumbra was used. And, 
although Douglas cites two law review articles on privacy, neither 
uses the word penumbra.s1 
Penumbra also appears in the concurring opinions of Justices 
Goldberg and Harlan, but neither Justice expands upon Justice 
Douglas's use of the term. Unlike Justice Douglas, Justice 
Goldberg does quote from a dissenting opinion from Olmstead v. 
United States, but he quotes the famous passage of Brandeis's dis-
sent invoking "the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of 
rights and the right most valued by civilized men. "sz He neither 
quotes nor cites the Holmes dissent.SJ 
So why did Douglas use penumbra? We know he liked the 
word, having used it more often than any other Supreme Court Jus-
tice. He used it loosely, to mean something within the indistinct 
boundaries of something else. He was not, based on his past uses of 
the word, accustomed to thinking about a penumbra as a shadow or 
49. 381 u.s. 479, 483 (1965). 
50. !d. at 485. 
51. !d., ciring Griswold, The Righr co be Ler Alone, 55 Nw. U.L. REV. 216 (1960) and 
Beaney, The Consrirurional Righr ro Privacy in rhe Supreme Courr, 1962 SuP. CT. REV. 212. 
Griswold uses neither the word penumbra nor the idea of building an expansive right to 
privacy out of emanations of the Bill of Rights. Beaney discusses the idea that a right to 
privacy could be built by expanding the fourth and fifth amendments, as Brandeis had sought 
to do in his dissent in 0/msread, but he rejects that as unlikely. !d. at 250-51. Instead, he 
urged that privacy be viewed as part of the "liberty" protected by the fifth and fourteenth 
amendments. !d. at 246-51. 
In 1958, penumbra featured in a debate on legal positivism carried on between H.L.A. 
Hart and Lon Fuller in the pages of the Harvard Law Review. Hart discussed the important 
distinction between meanings of the law that were at the core and those at the penumbra. He 
argued that the existence of penumbral questions where social policy was called into play 
should not be allowed to obscure the existence of the core questions, where there is a clear 
"law." Hart, Posirivism and rhe Separarion of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REv. 593, 607-
615 (1958). Fuller argued that Hart"s conception of the core and penumbra contained a new 
and incorrect theory of judicial interpretation. Fuller, Posirivism and Fide/icy ro Law-A 
Reply co Professor Harr, 71 HAR\'. L. REV. 630, 661-69 (1958). Those articles had no appar-
ent effect on Griswold and made no obvious impression on Douglas, who never cited them in 
any of his opinions. 
52. 381 U.S. at 494, (quoring Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (Brandeis. J., 
dissenting)). 
53. Beaney, writing about the right to privacy, examined 0/msread carefully and dis-
missed the Holmes dissent as "of little significance for the purpose of this paper." Beaney, 
The Consrirurional Righr co Privacy, 1962 SuP. CT. REV. 212, 223-24. 
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shading; he used it only as a dead metaphor without reference to its 
primary meaning. 
Douglas had earlier referred to things in the penumbra of "ex-
press statutory mandates," "a statute," "those few principles which 
[Congress] codified," "Louisiana law," "the constitutional require-
ment of 'case or controversy,' " and simply "the law." It was a 
short step to penumbras of the "specific guarantees in the Bill of 
Rights ... formed by emanations from those guarantees that help 
give them life and substance." For Douglas, penumbra appears to 
have meant fringe and nothing more. He seems not to have cared 
that penumbra might not carry that meaning, or any meaning, for 
his readers. Neither did he show any indication of remembering the 
word's primary meaning, which allowed him to write of shadows 
cast by the very rights that are giving off emanations. Unless those 
rights are oddly shaped or come equipped with lamp shades, they 
will not cast shadows in the light they themselves give out. 
So Douglas used penumbra because he was a poor writer and 
he had used it before. Does it matter? I believe it does. Judicial 
opinions are persuasive documents that derive their power as much 
by their rhetoric as by their content. Judge Posner, for example, 
has shown how the Holmes dissent in Lochner v. New York draws 
its power from Holmes's language.s4 Griswold on the other hand, is 
weakened by Douglas's. I cannot argue that Griswold v. Connecti-
cut or the subsequent cases involving the constitutional right to pri-
vacy would have been decided differently if Douglas had used a 
different word, but I do think the word mattered, in at least two 
ways. 
First, he chose a poor word to express his concept. The theme 
of the Douglas opinion seems to be that privacy is on the border of 
several established constitutional rights. Penumbra was little 
known, poorly understood, and subject to misunderstanding. To 
the extent its meaning is known, it has a dark coloration. It is, after 
all, a word about shadow and shades. One scarcely wants to think 
about important affirmative rights as patterns of different degrees of 
darkness.ss 
54. R. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE 281-89 (1988). Posner explicitly cites six 
judges as having "extremely interesting styles": Marshall, Cardozo, Brandeis, Learned 
Hand, Robert Jackson, and Holmes. As discussed above, three of those six were frequent 
users of "penumbra." 
55. It is possible to think of the Bill of Rights as providing shelter or protection from 
the harsh rays of the sun/state. In that case, having more protecting rights blocking the 
source of the light would lead to a deeper shadow and more protection. This is a plausible 
interpretation of penumbra, particularly in a case involving privacy, where shelter from pub-
lic scrutiny is crucial. This interpretation still conjures up the unhappy image of the constitu-
tional liberty as involving hiding from the light, like scurrying cockroaches. In the context of 
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If Douglas wanted to find the right to privacy in the outskirts 
of the more specific rights granted by the Bill of Rights, he might 
have used two different kinds of words. He could have talked about 
rights on the fringe or periphery of the specific rights granted by the 
Bill of Rights. Douglas faced some problems there in choosing 
good words, as most of the words for border have belittling conno-
tations-he would not have wanted to talk of peripheral rights, 
fringe rights, or borderline rights. On the other hand, rather than 
neighboring shadow, he could have associated the right to privacy 
with neighboring light: "The specific guarantees in the Bill of 
Rights" could have an aura, a radiance, a glow, a halo, or (a term 
used in the opinion) emanations that provide a right to privacy. 
The subconscious coloring would have been more affirmative. 
More fundamentally, the metaphor of penumbra provides poor 
support for Douglas's position.s6 Constitutional rights do not cast 
shadows. They do not encompass things close to them merely be-
cause they are close, nor should they.s1 And, to the extent that 
rights have indistinct edges, there is no necessary reason to think 
that the borders of other rights will be overlapping. 
Instead, Douglas should have argued that a unitary logic con-
nects the varied provisions of the first, third, fourth, and fifth 
amendments. They are, at least in relevant part, expressions of an 
underlying idea or theme that should be given effect independent of 
their specific words. The metaphor of a penumbra--or an aura or 
emanation-is based on proximity and is mechanical, not logical. 
The proximity of additional rights does not add force to the argu-
ment for privacy, but the existence of a common idea in express 
rights does. The concept of a common theme, or the metaphor of 
weaving with a common thread, illustrates a better argument for 
privacy.ss 
Words matter. Justice Holmes is remembered, respected, 
quoted, and alive in part because of his ideas, in part because he 
Griswold, it is completely inconsistent with Douglas's conclusion that the Bill of Rights gave 
off affirmative emanations. 
56. In fairness to Justice Douglas, it should be noted that, at least according to Bernard 
Schwartz, he had originally wanted to base his opinion and the right to privacy solely on the 
first amendment. B. SCHWARTZ. THE UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS OF THE WARREN COURT 
230 (1985). It does make more sense to find a right along the borders of one other right, 
rather than on the periphery of several. In shifting at Justice Brennan's suggestion to a reli-
ance on more of the Bill of Rights, however, Douglas did not make an appropriate shift in his 
metaphor. 
57. That reasoning was criticized by Justice Black, dissenting in Griswold, as replacing 
specific rights with general rights. to the eventual evisceration of both. 381 U.S. at 509-10. 
58. That the right to privacy is better supported by finding a common theme in the Bill 
of Rights is not. of course, an original idea. See, e.g., Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf A 
Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 928 (1973). 
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looked like the perfect Supreme Court Justice, but in part because 
of his mastery of English. The same is true, to a lesser extent, of 
Justice Cardozo and Judge Hand. Consciously and unconsciously, 
words affect beliefs. Well-considered words can persuade; lazily 
adopted words can fail. Griswold's right to privacy continues to be 
controversial and its borders are indeed hazy and indistinct. Its ul-
timate reach may well be decided more by presidential elections and 
senatorial battles than by mere words. Nonetheless, I believe its 
future would be brighter if Justice Douglas had not located its 
source in "the partially shaded region around the shadow of an 
opaque body." 
